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‘… under the current emissions trading scheme ... 
Federated Farmers struggles to see a future for food 
production in New Zealand and therefore strongly argues 
for the exclusion of biological agricultural emissions from 
food production from the ETS.’ 
(Federated Farmers of New Zealand, 2011)
‘By lobbying to be let off the hook, Fonterra and the rest 
of the agriculture sector want to perpetuate ... the subsidy 
other sectors and taxpayers are making to cover farming’s 
ETS liabilities. It’s time for agriculture to enthusiastically 
take up its responsibilities in the ETS.’ 
(Rod Oram, 2011)
Agricultural emissions account for 
more than 46.5% of New Zealand’s 
total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
(Ministry for the Environment, 2011) and 
13.5% of global GHG emissions (IPCC, 
2007c). Excluding agriculture from global 
mitigation commitments has been shown 
to increase the cost of containing warming 
to 2°C by as much as 15–50% (Reisinger 
and Stroombergen, 2012).1 Clearly, the 
question of what response will effectively 
address these emissions is critically 
important to New Zealand and the 
world. However, as the above quotations 
illustrate, current views on what shape that 
response should take are polarised. This 
polarisation may have been exacerbated 
by the government’s initial framing of the 
emissions trading scheme as a response to 
a specific international obligation under 
Kyoto, a motivation that seems less salient 
since the Durban conference. Designing 
agricultural emissions policy will require 
balancing these views, and the views of 
all other New Zealanders, whose aims for 
agricultural emissions policy may bring in 
further dimensions. Implicitly, this involves 
optimising a social welfare function 
that considers the aims and motivations 
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of all New Zealanders. This article 
contributes to the agricultural emissions 
policy discussion by stepping back and 
considering these underlying motivations: 
why do individuals, communities, 
companies and government in New 
Zealand care about how agricultural 
emissions are addressed? 
We argue that New Zealanders’ 
diverse individual motivations can 
be grouped under three headings: (1) 
concern about the direct impacts of 
climate change on New Zealand and the 
world; (2) pressure from others based 
on their concern about climate change, 
be that from international countries and 
organisations or from climate-conscious 
consumers; and (3) concern about 
complementary environmental or social 
goals that are positively affected by 
addressing emissions. This framework is 
useful in setting out how our underlying 
motivations should shape our responses, 
and highlights the importance of 
choosing responses that will be robust 
in the face of future uncertainties. 
Understanding stakeholder aims and 
concerns is critical for a second reason. 
Implementing complex policy with a 
large number of actors and involving 
difficult and expensive monitoring, such 
as agricultural emissions policy, requires 
a high degree of voluntary compliance. 
Stakeholders, such as farmers and 
rural communities, are more likely 
to voluntarily comply when policy 
responses address, at least in part, their 
concerns and motivations (OECD, 2000). 
Explicitly considering the underlying 
motivations of all New Zealanders will 
assist in ensuring that policy responses 
appeal to a wide range of constituents, 
and will make implementation simpler 
and far more effective at achieving the 
many aims New Zealanders hold for 
addressing agricultural emissions.
Motivations for addressing agricultural 
emissions
Different New Zealanders will be 
motivated to address the issue of 
agricultural emissions for different 
reasons and to differing degrees; indeed, 
some will not be interested in addressing 
it at all. This article does not attempt to 
present a consensus view of why New 
Zealanders should address agricultural 
emissions, or aim to present any specific 
group’s or individual’s motivations. 
Instead, it aims to set out all of the possible 
motivations to act that well-informed 
and rational New Zealanders might 
hold, and investigate how these different 
motivations should shape the sort of 
responses we make. Understanding these 
underlying motivations is essential for 
the design of effective policy: we need to 
understand what it is we want to achieve 
before we can consider what will achieve 
it.
Motivation one: climate change is likely 
to cause serious damage and reducing 
agricultural emissions will help to reduce 
the risk
Climate change could affect New 
Zealanders either directly (through 
physical changes brought about by 
global temperature rises) or indirectly 
(through flow-on effects from physical 
changes in other countries that are then 
transmitted to New Zealanders – for 
example, through trade). We might also 
be concerned about the negative impacts 
that climate change will have on others in 
the world. This motivation is predicated 
on the accepted likelihood that, globally, 
climate change will cause damage and 
that reducing agricultural emissions will 
help reduce this damage (IPCC, 2007a 
and 2007b).
Direct impacts on New Zealanders
In a recent summary of science assessing 
the likely direct physical impacts of 
climate change on New Zealand, the 
authors find that the physical effects on 
New Zealand over the next half century 
are expected to be mild, particularly when 
compared with other countries (Ministry 
for the Environment, 2008). Average 
temperatures across New Zealand are 
expected to increase by approximately 
1°C by 2040 and 2°C by 2090 (relative to 
average temperatures in 1990). Rainfall 
is expected to decrease in the north and 
east of the country and increase in the 
south, although there is large variability 
across specific locations and seasons in 
these estimates. On the positive side, 
New Zealand would face significantly 
fewer days with frosts, and improved 
pastoral productivity over much of the 
country. However, research suggests that 
extreme events (droughts and floods) 
will become more common and more 
serious (McMillan et al., 2010). 
Indirect international impacts on New 
Zealanders
New Zealanders could also be affected 
by global climate change through 
international effects that are transmitted 
to New Zealand from overseas. These 
indirect effects would result from physical 
climate change effects on other countries, 
their responses to these effects, and the 
flow-on effects on the goods and services 
that New Zealand imports and exports. 
A recent paper by Stroombergen (2010) 
looks at one possible path: international 
agricultural prices. He finds that, by 2070, 
global climate impacts on agriculture 
will have led to reduced international 
agricultural production and higher 
prices for New Zealand exports, and 
that New Zealanders will benefit 
economically from these indirect effects.2 
These benefits could be somewhat muted 
if agriculture production worldwide 
increases due to increased carbon 
fertilisation. Stroombergen also finds 
that these indirect effects are likely 
to significantly outweigh any direct 
... by 2070, global climate impacts on agriculture 
will have led to reduced international agricultural 
production and higher prices for New Zealand 
exports, and that New Zealanders will benefit 
economically from these indirect effects.
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economic impacts of climate change on 
New Zealand agriculture.
Climate change may also lead to 
economic and political instability, and 
is likely to affect migration flows. These 
could all have large indirect effects for 
New Zealanders, although the size of 
these impacts is impossible to assess 
accurately (Burson, 2010).
Direct and indirect international impacts
Current research shows that the negative 
effects of global climate change outside 
New Zealand are likely to be widespread 
and serious (IPCC, 2007b). We may be 
motivated by altruism and a sense of 
justice to minimise these effects.
Motivation two: pressure from others based 
on their concern about climate change
Another possible motivation for 
addressing agricultural GHG emissions 
is that we face pressure from others 
outside New Zealand who are concerned 
about climate change. This international 
pressure could come from two distinct 
sources: from national governments or 
international organisations such as the 
UN; additionally or alternatively, we might 
be motivated to act because of pressure 
or opportunities coming from climate-
concerned international consumers or 
markets. 
Pressure from other national governments or 
international organisations
New Zealanders are likely to face the cost 
of agricultural emissions whether or not 
we have a domestic policy that accounts 
for them. New Zealand is a signatory to the 
Kyoto Protocol and is committed to taking 
responsibility for any emissions above 
1990 levels over the period 2008–2012.3 
While future Kyoto commitment periods 
are not certain, it is highly likely that 
there will continue to be an international 
carbon price and carbon market of some 
form (Emissions Trading Scheme Review 
Panel, 2011). Also, regardless of the state 
of these international agreements, the 
New Zealand government has made 
commitments to take responsibility for 
New Zealand’s emissions going forward. 
This includes a commitment to making a 
10–20% cut in emissions relative to 1990 
emissions by 2020,4 and a 50% emissions 
cut by 2050 (Smith, 2011). New Zealand 
will face international pressure to meet 
these commitments regardless of whether 
a formal global agreement is reached. 
Alongside these formal external 
pressures to ‘pull our weight’, New 
Zealanders may be motivated to address 
agricultural emissions because we 
individually desire New Zealand to be 
viewed in a good light by the rest of 
the world. A favourable international 
image also has benefits for New Zealand 
at the macro level, including increased 
tourism and economic opportunities 
(Ministry for the Environment, 2001) 
and co-operative relations with other 
countries in trade, investment, security 
and bio-security. Credibility on climate 
issues also increases New Zealand’s 
ability to influence the design of future 
international climate agreements (such 
as, for example, international carbon 
accounting rules).
Pressure from international consumers and 
markets
New Zealanders may be motivated to 
act due to pressure and opportunities 
from climate-concerned international 
markets and consumers. There is a risk 
that if we do not adequately address 
agricultural emissions, we may be closed 
out of international markets or lose our 
position as a favoured supplier to large 
buyers. Consumer demand for New 
Zealand products may also fall if we are 
seen as emissions-intensive producers 
(Saunders and Barber, 2008). However, 
climate-conscious consumers also offer 
opportunities. If New Zealand producers 
can meet the concerns of these consumers 
they may be able to access higher-value 
markets. Saunders et al. (2011) argue 
that New Zealand producers could 
receive substantial price premiums if 
our agricultural output is perceived 
internationally as of low emissions 
intensity. 
Efficiency motivations
If New Zealanders want to decrease 
countrywide GHG emissions, we may 
want to address agricultural emissions 
because it is an efficient way to achieve 
our targets. New Zealand’s Emissions 
Trading Scheme Review Panel (2011) 
concluded that agricultural emissions 
abatement opportunities exist, and that 
as a result agricultural emissions should 
be addressed within the emissions trading 
scheme for efficiency reasons. Reisinger 
and Stroombergen (2012) model the costs 
of meeting global GHG targets under 
different policy settings. They find that 
excluding agricultural emissions from 
international climate mitigation results 
in significantly higher costs of meeting 
GHG targets, both internationally and 
for New Zealand. Agricultural emissions 
make up almost half of New Zealand’s 
gross emissions. Under our current 
commitments, and at a conservative 
carbon price of $NZ25, by 2020 New 
Zealand agricultural emissions will have 
an annual opportunity cost of $1 billion.5 
If New Zealanders could costlessly reduce 
emissions from agriculture even by 10% we 
would benefit annually by $100 million.6 
Additionally, omitting agriculture 
from efforts to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions would create inconsistencies 
and distortions. We might want to avoid 
these inconsistencies based on equity 
grounds: if the New Zealand government 
regulates to internalise the cost of other 
industries’ emissions (as is New Zealand’s 
current approach through the emissions 
trading scheme), then it seems reasonable 
that agriculture industries also should 
bear the cost of their emissions. We might 
also wish to be consistent across industries 
to avoid distorting investment incentives. 
There is a risk that if we do not adequately address 
agricultural emissions, we may be closed out of 
international markets or lose our position as a 
favoured supplier to large buyers.
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If agricultural producers do not face 
the external costs of their emissions as 
other industries do, the incentive to shift 
resources away from emissions-intensive 
industries such as agriculture will be 
distorted; agricultural production will in 
effect be subsidised.7 Incentives to invest 
in technologies to reduce agricultural 
emissions would also decrease. 
Interest in complementary goals
A final motivation for addressing 
agricultural GHG emissions may be 
that the same actions we implement 
to address agricultural emissions will 
also advance other goals we have. 
Complementary goals could consist of 
complementary environmental outcomes, 
such as improved water quality, increased 
biodiversity, or decreased soil erosion. 
They could also include rurally-focused 
aims such as long-term rural sustainability, 
resilience of rural communities, or 
increased farm profitability (through 
improved on-farm efficiency). While it is 
unlikely that we would choose to address 
agricultural emissions solely to achieve 
a complementary goal, recognising that 
some New Zealanders are motivated by 
complementary goals could alter the 
way we choose to respond to agricultural 
emissions, and increase the constituency 
of New Zealanders who will support 
actions that address them. 
Actions we take to address agricultural 
emissions that also contribute towards 
complementary goals should be 
enhanced to take into account their 
additional benefits. Likewise, any actions 
that are aimed at affecting some other 
outcome, but that also have positive 
agricultural emissions impacts, should be 
strengthened.
Relationships among the different 
motivations
These different motivations are related to and 
interlinked with each other. The relationship 
between motivations one (a desire to avoid 
climate change) and two (international and 
commercial pressure to reduce emissions) 
is of particular interest, as this relationship 
is liable to change as (or if) international 
agreements (or informal commitments) 
to limit GHG emissions become more 
stringent. This interplay has implications for 
the responses we should make.
In the short term, acting optimally to 
influence long-run climate mitigation, 
acting to meet short-term international 
obligations, and acting to take advantage 
of commercial opportunities lead to 
somewhat different actions. For example, 
any actions that decrease emissions are 
useful for mitigating climate change, but 
appealing to climate-conscious consumers 
requires mitigation that is visible and 
marketable: effort needs to be expended on 
marketing and not just on the mitigation. 
However, as international agreements 
become more stringent over time, the two 
motivations can be addressed with similar 
responses. This becomes clearer when 
we consider the impact of international 
agreements: their aim is to assign the 
external cost of GHGs produced to the 
country that produced them. Governments 
of countries then decide whether and how 
to pass the costs of emissions on to their 
own citizens and businesses. These global 
agreements are not currently stringent 
enough to limit GHG production to a 
globally optimal level. As a response, some 
consumers and markets are willing to 
pay a premium or offer preferred access 
to producers whose products are less 
emissions intensive. These consumers and 
markets are implicitly pricing the emissions 
mitigation carried out by these producers 
that is not currently internalised by global 
emissions agreements. As the stringency of 
agreements increases, the previously external 
cost of emissions will be internalised to the 
country of origin: consumers and markets 
will be less willing to pay a premium 
for low emissions production. The 
motivations to reduce emissions to meet 
our international commitments and avert 
global warming will align and increase and 
the motivation to reduce emissions due to 
consumer pressure will decrease, and in the 
long run may be wholly captured by the 
international agreements. Consequently, 
when we make long-run investments or 
decisions with long-run implications, we 
should make them in accordance with 
the need to avoid global climate change 
and to meet our international emissions 
commitments (motivations one and two), 
and not to meet international consumer 
pressure. 
The relationship between motivations 
one and two illustrates the underlying, 
and potentially conflicting, goals inherent 
in any decision to address agricultural 
emissions: maximising environmental 
outcomes and maximising economic 
outcomes. In the short term these 
two goals are often substitutes, and 
maximising one goal comes at the expense 
of the other. For example, decreasing 
the GHG production of New Zealand’s 
farms involves costly mitigation. In the 
short run, requiring this will maximise 
environmental outcomes at the expense 
of economic outcomes. However, as 
described above, in the long term New 
Zealand’s economic and environmental 
outcomes are inextricably intertwined. 
While the short term may invite different 
responses for each goal, in the long run 
the ideal response for each is similar. New 
Zealand’s future economic outcomes 
depend heavily on the future environment: 
significant global warming will restrict 
future economic outcomes, and in 
the long run the emissions content of 
production is likely to be internalised and 
faced by the country of origin, if not by 
the producer. Consequently, maximising 
long-run environmental outcomes is 
crucial for both environmental and 
economic reasons. 
... when we make long-run investments or 
decisions with long-run implications, we should 
make them in accordance with the need to 
avoid global climate change and to meet our 
international emissions commitments ... and  
not to meet international consumer pressure.
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Factors influencing the intensity of response
The intensity with which we should 
address agricultural emissions depends 
on the number of motivations to act 
that we hold, and how strongly we hold 
each motivation. Other factors include 
how effective we expect our response 
will be at addressing our motivations, 
the opportunity cost of acting, and 
the potential for counter-productive 
outcomes, such as emissions leakage or 
decreased food security. The timing of 
our response is also of importance: when 
should we act? 
New Zealanders’ possible impact on climate 
change
Any GHG emission reductions that we 
carry out in New Zealand will have a very 
small direct effect on global emissions 
because of New Zealand’s size. This of 
course is true of any small country’s or 
region’s actions. Our reduction efforts 
could still be important for controlling 
global emissions for two reasons: 
technology and policy transfer; and 
building global co-operation.
Technology and policy learning and transfer
If New Zealand can learn how to design 
policy to effectively and efficiently control 
agricultural emissions without excessive 
social cost, and we are able to communicate 
this to other countries, we will potentially 
be able to reduce the cost of emissions 
reductions in other countries. This could 
lower other countries’ emissions by reducing 
their resistance to policies that control 
agricultural emissions, and ensuring that 
they adopt already-proven policies. While 
this could be achieved through research 
alone, demonstration of technologies and 
policies that observably reduce emissions 
without unacceptable human or financial 
costs will be more compelling. We are also 
likely to learn by doing in ways that we 
cannot through research alone. 
Building global co-operation
Achieving global co-operation on an issue 
that affects all sectors and individuals, 
involves considerable uncertainty, and is 
likely to be costly presents a particularly 
recalcitrant problem. The core challenge is 
that every individual, sector and country 
has an incentive to ‘free-ride’, as no one has 
a large individual impact on the problem, 
and people face significant direct costs 
of action for an infinitesimal decrease in 
their own risk of facing climate change 
costs. While rational, purely self-interested 
humans would achieve little co-operation, 
the work of Elinor Ostrom and others has 
shown that most humans are not purely 
self-interested, and that in an indefinitely 
repeated game, when leaders display co-
operative behaviour and the cost of co-
operating is reduced, high levels of co-
operation can occur (Ostrom, 1990). New 
Zealand has disproportionate visibility in 
the climate sphere. Our efforts will likewise 
have disproportionate impact on others’ 
willingness to act by both building trust 
and demonstrating that reductions can be 
achieved without undue social cost.
Risks from action
The cost of reducing emissions will limit 
the extent to which New Zealanders will 
want to respond to these motivations 
to do so. One factor will be the expense 
of decreasing emissions: the cost of 
contributing may be perceived as high 
relative to the gains that would result. The 
opportunity cost may also limit action: 
New Zealanders may want to spend their 
money addressing other issues. Others 
may believe that our best response is to 
focus only on adaptation rather than on 
emissions control. Along with these, there 
are two interrelated reasons why acting 
may be counter-productive: emissions 
leakage and food security. These may 
result in New Zealanders choosing not to 
act on agricultural emissions even if we 
are concerned about climate change.
Emissions leakage
One potential concern is that reducing 
emissions in New Zealand will be 
ineffective because of ‘emissions leakage’. 
When agricultural emissions are reduced, 
the resulting increase in agricultural 
production costs may mean that 
some exported products are no longer 
competitive, or that products imported 
from countries with less stringent climate 
policies are substituted for domestic 
products. This could lead to some 
agricultural production relocating to 
countries without climate policies. This 
leakage would lead to job losses in New 
Zealand but no change in global GHG 
emissions. If international production is 
more emissions intensive than the New 
Zealand production, then leakage could 
even increase global emissions.
While leakage is a potential result of 
addressing agricultural emissions, Kerr 
and Zhang’s (2009) survey of existing 
empirical evidence on the responsiveness 
of livestock production in New Zealand 
to changes in profit finds that, although 
there would be significant hardship for 
farmers, there is unlikely to be significant 
leakage at carbon prices of around $25 
per tonne of CO2. Given the proposed 
policy of output-based free allocation 
of allowances to agricultural producers, 
leakage is likely to be even lower than 
Kerr and Zhang’s estimates (Greenhalgh 
et al., 2007).
Food security
Another potential concern is that 
decreasing agricultural emissions will 
reduce food production and food 
security and may mean that more people 
go hungry. However, this would occur 
only if the only response to agricultural 
emissions policy is a reduction in food 
production (e.g. stock numbers are 
decreased to reduce emissions) and this 
food is not replaced elsewhere (either as 
dairy/meat or something else of equal 
nutritional value), and richer people 
who have more than adequate food 
are not the only ones affected. Even in 
Our efforts will ... have disproportionate impact 
on others’ willingness to act by both building trust 
and demonstrating that reductions can be achieved 
without undue social cost.
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this situation, any decreases in food 
production as described above could be 
compensated for in three ways. The first 
is through rises in the price of food that 
New Zealand previously provided (e.g. 
dairy, lamb or beef), which induces an 
increase in production elsewhere. The 
second is if investment capital that would 
have been deployed for food production 
in New Zealand moves to a food sector in 
another country. The third is if land that 
was used for food production is converted 
to forestry in New Zealand, and the 
resulting increase in timber supply lowers 
global timber prices and hence reduces 
demand for land for plantation forestry 
elsewhere, thus freeing up agricultural 
land internationally. Obviously, all these 
effects will be extremely small for any New 
Zealand policy, but we can expect them to 
be larger if we set a precedent for efforts 
by much larger countries.
There are clear contradictions between 
food security and emissions leakage 
fears. If food production decreases 
in New Zealand are directly replaced 
internationally with the same type of food 
(e.g. dairy or meat), then leakage will have 
occurred, but there will be no decline in 
food security. If, instead, decreases in 
New Zealand food production are not 
replaced overseas then there may be some 
decrease in food security, but no emissions 
leakage will have occurred. If leakage is 
a serious problem, then food security 
is not. Kerr and Zhang (2009) conclude 
that it is unlikely that significant levels 
of emissions leakage or food insecurity 
will result from the introduction of New 
Zealand’s emissions trading scheme with 
a carbon price of around $25.
Timing of response
Regardless of our motivation, we may 
be able to decrease future costs (or take 
full advantage of future opportunities) 
if we begin to transition our economy to 
lower emissions now. This is true if we 
are personally motivated by currently-
held concerns about climate change, or 
expect to be motivated by them in the 
future: GHGs emitted now stay in the 
atmosphere and contribute to global 
warming long into the future. While the 
most prominent agricultural greenhouse 
gas, methane, has a relatively short lifespan 
in the atmosphere (approximately 12 
years), nitrous oxide has a lifetime of more 
than 100 years (IPCC, 2007a). Nitrous 
oxide makes up approximately a third 
of New Zealand’s agricultural emissions, 
equivalent to 17% of New Zealand’s total 
emissions (Ministry for the Environment, 
2009). This may lead us to focus more on 
reducing nitrous oxide, as its effects are long 
lasting, and only focusing on mitigating 
methane emissions to meet short-term 
goals or to avoid climate tipping points. 
We might also be motivated to begin 
time-consuming processes immediately. 
Research, learning and adoption all take 
time to produce useful outputs; if we 
want to enjoy their benefits in the future 
we need to start these processes now. 
Immediate action is also justified if 
we are motivated by pressure from other 
national governments or international 
organisations. The commitments made 
by the New Zealand government need 
to be met in the short term (Kyoto 
obligations), medium term (2020 targets) 
and longer term (2050 targets), and will 
require short-term action. 
What are the implications of these 
motivations for our responses?
Discussion up to this point has considered 
why New Zealanders want to address 
agricultural emissions, and, implicitly, 
what it is we want to achieve. In this 
section we consider the characteristics 
of responses that will address these 
different motivations. When thinking 
about the best way for New Zealanders 
to address agricultural emissions we need 
to consider which one (or combination) 
of the motivations outlined above is 
behind our actions. Effective policy 
will address the underlying motivation 
New Zealanders have for responding. 
Depending on our motivation, we will 
require our responses to achieve different 
levels of verifiability or visibility, will 
have different priorities for technological 
change, and will focus more or less on co-
operating and communicating with actors 
outside New Zealand. These dimensions 
are summarised in Table 1.8
Table 1: Choosing appropriate responses given our motivations
Responses
Visible/verifiable Technology change International 
communication and 
co-operation
Motivation one: 
avoid climate change
Needs to be visible and/
or verifiable to the 
farmer.
Needs to be verifiable 
and visible to New 
Zealand regulators if 
national policy.
Effort needs to be visible 
internationally to 
encourage others.
Mitigation 
technologies.
Some 
measurement 
and monitoring 
technologies.
Co-operate on 
mitigation 
development.
Share technologies 
and knowledge 
we develop.
Actively disseminate 
knowledge.
Motivation two: 
meet international 
pressure
– from countries 
or international 
organisations
Must be verifiable 
by international 
organisations.
Verifiable 
mitigation 
methods.
Demonstrate to 
international parties 
that we are meeting 
commitments.
– from international 
consumers/markets
Must be visible to 
consumers.
Visible mitigation 
methods.
Marketing 
technologies.
Show effort that 
is convincing 
to international 
consumers.
Motivation three: 
achieve 
complementary goals
Effect on 
complementary goals 
needs to be visible to 
communities of interest.
Technologies 
that positively 
affect our 
complementary 
goals.
None unless 
community 
of interest is 
international, such 
as biodiversity.
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If we are motivated by concern about 
climate change (motivation one), then 
any actions that decrease emissions will 
be valuable. Our response will need 
to be visible to those carrying out the 
mitigation (so that they know they are 
making a difference), and will need to 
be verifiable and visible in ways that 
encourage others to also decrease their 
emissions. This motivation will require 
technological progress focused on 
developing new and improved agricultural 
emissions mitigation methods, and 
the communication of these findings 
to New Zealand farmers. We will also 
want to co-operate internationally on 
mitigation development and actively 
share new technologies and knowledge. 
New Zealand’s participation in the 
Global Research Alliance on agricultural 
GHGs is an example of a response which 
addresses this first motivation.9
Addressing international climate-
conscious consumer pressure will require 
that our actions and efforts are highly 
visible internationally. Developing 
effective ways to market our mitigation 
efforts to international consumers will be 
important. Our response will need to focus 
on mitigation methods that are visible and 
verifiable over those which have real but 
less verifiable environmental effects. 
If instead our concern is assuaging 
international pressure from other 
countries or international organisations, 
such as the UN, we will require a response 
with a focus on mitigation that meets 
internationally agreed-upon standards of 
verification.10 In the short run, we may 
be able to assuage international pressure 
through clever marketing and negotiation 
of favourable rules, but in the long run 
we will need to respond with integrity. 
Demonstrating integrity will require 
technological progress that results in 
improved abilities to measure, monitor 
and verify mitigation. A strong response 
will require new or improved mitigation 
methods. Demonstrating the rigour of 
these mitigation methods will require 
significant international communication. 
Responses to address complementary 
goals (motivation three) need not be as 
verifiable, but instead will have to have 
real impact on complementary goals. 
Technological development will need to 
focus on mitigation methods that have 
positive impacts on GHG emissions and 
on complementary goals: for example, 
if our complementary goal is improving 
water quality, we will need to focus on 
mitigation methods that have positive 
effects on GHG emissions and also on 
water quality, such as nitrogen inhibitors. 
If, as is likely, we are motivated to 
address agricultural emissions by some 
combination of these motivations, 
then our response should balance these 
different elements. Considering our 
response in terms of addressing our 
motivations in this way will be a useful 
way to consider appropriate policies.
Robustness
While we can control or influence 
many of the factors that will affect the 
success of our agricultural emissions 
response, some factors are beyond our 
control. These uncontrollable factors 
can be grouped under two headings: 
climate factors and international factors. 
Climate factors include the seriousness 
of the climate problem in the future, the 
existence and stringency of any binding 
global agreement, and the development 
of technologies for cheap and effective 
mitigation. International factors out of our 
control include world population growth, 
the global economy and agricultural 
prices (both partly driven by climate 
change itself), and the existence of trade 
barriers. Different possible outcomes (and 
combinations of outcomes) of these factors 
will affect the success of our response; we 
need to consider their robustness to these 
factors when designing responses. 
Robust responses will be those that 
are flexible, scalable and cost-effective. 
The need for flexibility is clear: we need 
to avoid locking ourselves into any set 
approach to addressing agricultural 
emissions, and to be able to alter our 
approach as new mitigation options arise 
or opportunity costs of responding are 
faced. Our response will also need to be 
easily up- or downscaled: we need to be 
able to alter the intensity of our response 
in reaction to the seriousness of climate 
change and to other countries’ responses. 
Our response will also need to be high 
value: that is, effective at addressing our 
motivations and low-cost. 
Discussion
Designing effective agricultural GHG 
emissions policy first requires an 
understanding of the well-informed 
concerns and motivations of New 
Zealanders because we are trying to 
maximise the welfare of all New Zealanders, 
and because we need voluntary compliance 
to make implementation possible and to 
encourage strong behavioural change. 
New Zealanders also need to be mindful 
of the many uncontrollable factors that 
will influence the success of any response 
we make. We should attempt to ensure 
that our response is robust in likely 
future scenarios by building in flexibility, 
scalability and cost-effectiveness. 
If we believe that New Zealand is 
likely to face a price on carbon emissions 
in the future, explicit or otherwise, 
then when making decisions with long-
term consequences New Zealanders 
should focus on responses that will 
sustainably decrease global agricultural 
GHG emissions, rather than attempting 
to appeal to international consumers 
or regulators. These responses will be 
characterised by integrity, significant 
international engagement and co-
operation, and a focus on policy and 
mitigation technology development. 
Finally, there is an opportunity to 
broaden the consensus for addressing 
agricultural emissions by focusing on 
outcomes other than climate change. 
New Zealanders are motivated to address 
agricultural emissions for a wide range of 
reasons, not only because they personally 
care about helping New Zealand meet 
international emissions commitments 
or reducing the risk of climate change. 
Focusing on responses that have 
positive complementary impacts on 
GHG emissions and also on issues that 
potentially resistant New Zealanders 
care about, such as water quality or on-
farm efficiency, may promote action on 
agricultural emissions. 
1  Additionally, higher costs of achieving climate targets will 
inherently make reaching agreement on co-operative global 
climate action more difficult. 
2  Stroombergen’s result assumes no change in extreme events 
such as floods and droughts, or extreme human responses 
(such as financial crises or war). 
3  That is, to either have net emissions that are on average 
no higher than our gross emissions in 1990, or buy carbon 
allowances on the international market to make up the 
difference.
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4  This commitment came as part of New Zealand’s 
association with the Copenhagen accord. This commitment 
is conditional on a number of issues, such as commensurate 
efforts by other countries, an acceptable global agreement, 
and effective rules managing land use, land use change and 
forestry (LULUCF), among others (Smith and Groser, 2010).
5  The Ministry for the Environment projects agricultural 
emissions in 2020 to be equal to 39,072,000t of CO2 
equivalent, an 8% increase on 2010 agricultural emissions 
(2009).
6  This benefit could come from decreased costs of buying 
international allowances to cover our emissions, or from 
increased incomes from the sale of surplus allowances 
internationally. 
7  Because agricultural emissions in other countries are 
currently unregulated, the appropriate incentives to invest 
in low-emissions agricultural production are distorted 
internationally, and the pricing of emissions in New Zealand 
may lead to leakage. The issue of leakage is discussed below.
8  Note that this section is not concerned with ‘selling’ policy 
to different stakeholders with different motivations to act. 
Instead, it outlines the characteristics of responses that will 
best meet different motivations.
9  The Global Research Alliance is a voluntary, collaborative 
international agreement that aims to ‘find ways to grow more 
food without growing GHG emissions’. More information can 
be found at http://www.globalresearchalliance.org.
10 Our current ETS addresses this motivation. For example, it 
requires forests to be at least 30m wide to meet international 
monitoring requirements, ignoring the benefit of riparian 
plantings, and does not allow pre-1990 forest to be cleared 
and replaced with new forests that will have identical storage 
capacity (Karpas and Kerr, 2011). 
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